Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 12, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
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In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 12, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
In: Journal of political economy microeconomics, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 781-807
ISSN: 2832-9368
In: Journal of political economy microeconomics, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 557-613
ISSN: 2832-9368
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In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 5, S. 205-209
ISSN: 1944-7981
We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w26734
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In: Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 19-127, June 2019
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In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 5, S. 220-224
ISSN: 1944-7981
Honesty is the best policy in the face of a strategy-proof mechanism--irrespective of others' behavior, the best course of action is to report one's preferences truthfully. We review evidence from different markets in different countries and find that a substantial percentage of participants do not report their true preferences to the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism. Two recurring correlates of preference misrepresentation are lower cognitive ability and the expectation of stronger competition. We evaluate possible explanations, which we hope will inform practicing market designers.